The Rise of the Left-Libertarian

 

Why some liberals are becoming libertarian about power without becoming conservative about government.

Something is shifting inside liberal politics, but the old labels do a poor job of describing it.

My read does not come from a party platform or a neat ideological manifesto. It comes first from listening: watching the news, following social media, and paying attention to how people are arguing in real time. What stands out is that I keep hearing arguments that sound strangely libertarian coming from sectors where I would not normally expect them.

Not libertarian in the traditional economic sense. Not “abolish taxes,” “deregulate everything,” or “government is always the problem.” That is not the shift.

The shift is civil-libertarian: suspicion of centralized power, concern about surveillance, resistance to censorship, fear of digital control systems, distrust of public-private coordination, and a growing demand for privacy, autonomy, due process, and limits on authority.

What makes this interesting is where the language is coming from. Liberals worried about reproductive data. Progressives concerned about police surveillance. Younger Democrats skeptical of platform censorship and algorithmic control. People who still support public programs but do not want digital ID systems, age verification laws, or automated enforcement tools becoming access gates to ordinary life.

Social media is not proof by itself. We know it can make a handful of loud people look like a movement. But it is useful as a listening post. It shows what arguments are emerging before they harden into formal politics. And right now, the pattern is hard to miss: people who would never call themselves libertarian are making arguments about privacy, speech, surveillance, bodily autonomy, and institutional overreach that strongly resemble libertarian arguments.

The funny part is how strange some of the conversions look. I am seeing people with basically Trotskyist instincts drifting into prepper logic. The same people who once sounded like they wanted a central committee for every inconvenience are now talking about backup generators, cash on hand, water filters, canned peas, and enough instant ramen to survive six months of institutional failure. That is not a small vibe shift. That is an ideological witness protection program with a pantry.

Democrats are not becoming libertarians in the traditional sense. They are not suddenly abandoning healthcare access, labor protections, environmental rules, antitrust enforcement, or public investment. The old right-libertarian package still does not fit most of them. They are not becoming anti-government across the board.

But many are becoming more suspicious of control.

That suspicion is showing up across issues that used to be treated separately: digital privacy, reproductive data, platform censorship, police surveillance, AI scoring, banking access, age verification, biometric identity, emergency powers, and corporate control over speech and participation. Taken one by one, these look like isolated debates. Taken together, they suggest a new political temperament forming on the left.

Call it big-government, small-surveillance politics: a left-leaning instinct that still believes in public goods and regulation, but rejects the expanding machinery of tracking, censorship, digital identity, automated scoring, and permission-based access to ordinary life.

This type still supports public goods, but is less willing to trust institutions with systems that can monitor, restrict, rank, identify, or punish ordinary people. Government healthcare can make sense; medical surveillance cannot. Regulation can be necessary; bureaucratic black boxes are another matter. Safer online spaces may remain a goal; censorship tools create suspicion. Social programs still matter; digital identity systems that become access gates raise alarms. Corporate accountability remains central, but so does fear of banks, platforms, employers, and payment processors becoming private governments.

That is not traditional libertarianism. It is something more modern and messier.

The old libertarian model focused mainly on the state. The new anxiety is about networks of power: government agencies, tech platforms, banks, data brokers, universities, employers, NGOs, intelligence contractors, health systems, insurers, and AI vendors. No one has to declare tyranny for the system to become coercive. Control can arrive through compliance rules, risk scores, account suspensions, identity checks, automated flags, payment restrictions, and polite emails from departments with names like Trust and Safety.

This is why institutional trust matters so much. For years, many liberals accepted institutional power because they believed the institutions were mostly legitimate. That belief has weakened. People have watched public agencies reverse themselves, media institutions lose credibility, tech platforms moderate speech unevenly, universities moralize, employers police expression, and political leaders demand trust while offering little accountability.

When trust declines, people become less generous about granting new powers.

That is the hidden thread connecting many current debates. Digital ID is not just about identity. Age verification is not just about children. Platform moderation is not just about misinformation. Reproductive privacy is not just about healthcare. AI governance is not just about efficiency. Each issue raises the same underlying question:

Who gets to decide whether you can participate?

Once that question becomes visible, liberal politics changes.

Even Second Amendment language is beginning to cross strange boundaries. After the killing of Alex Pretti, a Minneapolis ICU nurse shot by federal agents, I noticed people who would normally reject gun-rights rhetoric making arguments that sounded almost Second Amendment-coded. Much of it began as a challenge to conservative consistency: if the right defends the Second Amendment, how can it justify a state response that treats lawful gun possession as an inherent threat?

But the discussion did not always stop at exposing hypocrisy. In some cases, it crossed into something more paradoxical: liberals known for opposing gun ownership began defending the logic of the right to bear arms, at least in that specific context. This was not old-school gun culture suddenly converting liberals into NRA lifers. It was distrust politics. In that frame, the right to bear arms stops looking like gun culture and starts looking more like the jailkeeper handing you the keys to the cage.

That is the deeper shift. People were watching a constitutional right become conditional in real time, and conditional rights have a way of making even institutionalists nervous. Once people start asking that question, they are already stepping outside the unwritten but mandatory liberal decalogue: the quiet list of positions one is expected to hold before being allowed to remain in good standing.

Reproductive politics may be the strongest accelerant. After the fall of Roe, privacy stopped being abstract for many women and liberals. Location data, period apps, pharmacy records, search history, payment trails, medical files, and travel records became part of the political battlefield. The lesson was simple: data collected for convenience can become evidence. A phone can become a witness. A platform can become a checkpoint.

That realization naturally pushes people toward stronger privacy instincts. Not as a niche tech issue, but as a civil-rights issue.

Speech is moving in a similar direction. Many liberals accepted aggressive content moderation when they saw it as a defense against extremism or dangerous misinformation. But censorship tools do not remain ideologically loyal. Once built, they can be expanded, privatized, redirected, or captured by a different administration. More liberals are likely to rediscover a very old civil-libertarian principle: powers created for emergencies rarely stay in their original box.

Corporate power also looks different now. The left has long criticized corporations for greed, inequality, and monopoly. But the newer concern is access. Banks, platforms, payment processors, app stores, employers, insurers, data brokers, and cloud providers can shape ordinary life without the constitutional restraints that apply to government. They can suspend accounts, throttle visibility, deny services, flag risk, sell data, and enforce norms at scale.

A private company can now do things that feel governmental, while still saying, technically, it is just business.

This is where a new liberal civil-libertarianism begins to make sense. It does not reject public power entirely. It rejects power without friction. Power without appeal. Power without transparency. Power without exit.

The likely platform of this emerging faction is not hard to imagine: strong privacy rights, limits on data brokers, encryption protections, medical data firewalls, police surveillance restrictions, due process before account or banking bans, transparency in AI decisions, protections for anonymous speech, and real alternatives to mandatory digital systems.

That platform would still sit on the left economically. It would support public investment, labor protections, healthcare access, antitrust enforcement, and consumer protections. But it would break sharply from establishment liberalism on trust. It would ask for proof, limits, audits, opt-outs, and enforceable rights before allowing institutions to build deeper systems of control.

This will create tension inside the Democratic coalition.

Institutional liberals will argue that modern problems require modern systems: digital infrastructure, expert administration, coordinated platforms, identity verification, content moderation, and automated enforcement. The left-libertarian answer will be that the more powerful the system, the stronger the restraints must be. They will not accept “trust us” as a governance model.

Both sides will claim to defend democracy. They will simply fear different failures. Institutional liberals will fear disorder. The left-libertarian faction will fear managed life.

That divide is likely to grow because the technology is not slowing down. Digital identity, AI scoring, biometric verification, financial surveillance, platform governance, and automated compliance are all expanding. Every expansion creates a new argument over convenience versus freedom, safety versus autonomy, inclusion versus control.

The old categories cannot contain this cleanly. Some liberals will still want more government in economic life and less government in personal life. Others will want regulation of corporations but strict limits on data collection. Some will favor public programs but reject centralized identity systems. Some will support safety rules but oppose speech enforcement.

The crossing is happening in the other direction too. Around AI, some conservatives and traditional libertarians are beginning to sound unexpectedly comfortable with state regulation. The same people who would normally flinch at government intervention now look at algorithmic control, synthetic media, job displacement, surveillance, and corporate AI power and ask whether the state has to step in. That is not a small contradiction. It shows that the old map is failing on both sides: liberals become more libertarian when public power turns into surveillance, while libertarians become more statist when private power starts looking like government.

To older political maps, that looks inconsistent.

It is not inconsistent.

It is a recognition that power has changed shape.

The next major ideological split may not be left versus right in the usual sense. It may be institutionalists versus big-government, small-surveillance politics. People who trust centralized systems versus people who believe those systems must be restrained before they become permanent.

A growing number of liberals are moving into that second camp. Quietly at first. Issue by issue. Privacy here. Speech there. Reproductive data. Police surveillance. AI scoring. Digital ID. Banking access. Platform control.

At some point, scattered instincts become a politics.

And when they do, the Democratic coalition may discover that its next internal rebellion does not come from the right. It comes from liberals who still believe in public goods, but no longer trust powerful institutions to define the terms of ordinary life.

Nativism Sells Like Hotcakes

 

The oldest fear in the human brain, served hot with fries.

Pete Hegseth went to Normandy, on the anniversary of D-Day, and spoke of European beaches being “stormed” again. Not by armies this time, but by “dangerous ideologies” arriving by sea. Boats. Men. Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria. The setting was not accidental: military graves, Allied memory, Europe as a civilization once saved and now supposedly at risk again. The message came wearing a borrowed helmet from history.

Marco Rubio, in Munich, wrapped the same anxiety in a more diplomatic phrase: civilizational erasure. He did not say white erasure in those words, but the subtext was sitting in the front row, jingling its keys. Low birth rates, migration, loss of national identity, Europe ceasing to be Europe. The old fear in foreign-policy clothing.

You have to give this rhetoric one thing: it is efficient. It does not need to explain much. It does not need to prove everything it suggests. It only has to place three things close together — death, offspring, group — and let the brain do the rest.

The offer almost writes itself: a share of collective eternity. Amazon Prime Day for immortality. For ten cents, you get the promise that something of yours will continue: your blood, your people, your name, your civilization, your kind. Not just individual immortality. Collective immortality. The family-size combo.

The price is in the fine print, though not that fine: othering whoever ends up on the wrong side of the line. The other child. The other neighbor. The other citizen. The other body that ruins the family portrait of destiny.

It is not a hard sell. The emotional tinder is everywhere. Fear of death, fear of losing status, fear that your children will live in a world that feels foreign, fear that history has no owner. The firecrackers are ancient: blood, soil, women, children, borders, invasion, purity, honor, humiliation. The whole Paleolithic kit with a microphone and a foreign-policy panel. A half-damp match is enough.

The disturbing part is not that the trick is sophisticated. It is that it does not need to be.

When demography enters politics in an apocalyptic tone, it stops speaking only about births, migration, or integration. It starts speaking about disappearance. It tells people that if they do not control who enters, who is born, and who belongs, they will be erased. Not as individuals, but as a symbolic species. Your lineage. Your world. Your acceptable version of the future.

And then the conversation changes temperature. An immigration law stops being just a law. A birth-rate statistic stops being just a statistic. A neighbor stops being just a neighbor. Everything begins to carry an ugly electricity, as if every unfamiliar body had arrived to claim a piece of your grave.

That is when the product appears: a family-size combo against death. Fake, greasy, and wrapped in nostalgic packaging. It promises that something resembling you will keep occupying the world, and calls that continuity. It promises that the lineage can do what the body cannot: remain.

Ethnic purity, civilizational obsession, fertility turned into patriotic duty: all of it builds a blender with a halo. Reproduction, status, and anxiety packaged as destiny.

This is where identity enters the sale. Not as a private philosophical puzzle, but as the hinge that lets the product work. If the group is just a group, demographic change is political. If the group is you, demographic change becomes mortality.

Octavio Paz, in  The Labyrinth of Solitude, makes the first shock of self-consciousness briefly breathable. He writes of the adolescent startled by being, leaning over the river of his own consciousness and seeing a face distorted by the water, wondering whether it is his. That tremor is real. There is a moment when simply living is no longer enough: you also begin to watch yourself live. The reflection appears. Distance appears. The strangeness of being separated from yourself appears.

But nativism industrializes that tremor. It turns self-consciousness into bloodline panic. It takes the mirror and bolts it to a border fence.

The pitch does not work on everyone. For some, the question “who am I?” looks less like liberation than paperwork. The moment someone rehearses an answer in the mirror, the coherence audit begins.

But throughout history, most humans did not live that way. They lived through lineages, houses, tribes, religions, peoples, surnames, inheritances, borders, dead ancestors who still give orders, and futures to be administered. The idea of not seeking immortality through offspring, of not feeling the group as an extension of the body, of not needing “one’s own” to survive in order for one’s life to have mattered, is fairly rare. Modern, urban, individualist in the best sense. Also fragile.

That is why the product sells.

Because it does not present itself as a product. It presents itself as duty, memory, belonging, defense, love of children, respect for the dead. No one thinks they are buying fear. They think they are buying continuity.

And once someone is buying continuity, almost any price begins to look reasonable.

Even the other.

Especially the other.

Technology & National Boundaries: A Civilization Mismatch

 

One of the stranger realizations that emerges from studying Big History and complexity theory is that technological progress and social maturity do not necessarily move at the same speed.

In fact, they often appear to move at dramatically different speeds.

Humanity can map distant galaxies, sequence genomes, and train large language models on significant portions of civilization’s accumulated knowledge. At the same time, it remains perfectly capable of organizing itself around tribal loyalties, centuries-old grievances, status competitions, and disputes whose origins predate the printing press.

This creates a peculiar form of cognitive whiplash.

On one scale, we inhabit a civilization of astonishing sophistication. On another, we remain a species of highly social primates navigating incentives, identities, and narratives that would have been recognizable to our ancestors thousands of years ago.

The contradiction is only apparent. Both realities are true simultaneously.

Scott Page would likely describe this as a consequence of complex adaptive systems operating on multiple timescales. Technologies can evolve rapidly while institutions, cultures, and governance structures adapt much more slowly. New layers of complexity emerge long before older layers disappear.

The result is a civilization where the props often feel futuristic but the setting still looks archaeological.

Bronze Age instincts coexist with medieval identities, industrial institutions, global communication networks, and frontier artificial intelligence. The layers accumulate faster than they are replaced.

This observation becomes especially relevant when discussing AI.

Many current debates assume that the primary challenge is technical: building capable systems, ensuring safety, increasing performance, and managing deployment. Those are important concerns. Yet an equally important question sits beneath them:

What happens when technologies begin operating at a civilizational scale while governance remains organized around nations?

The mismatch is difficult to ignore.

The training data used by advanced AI systems is not American knowledge, Chinese knowledge, or Argentine knowledge. It is the accumulated symbolic residue of civilization itself: languages, books, scientific papers, software repositories, journalism, philosophy, art, documentation, and billions of human interactions flowing across borders.

The resource is transnational.

The disruption is transnational.

The governance remains national.

Which is a bit like discovering a new continent and then insisting the most important question is which municipal office should process the paperwork.

And that would be manageable if nations themselves behaved like mature participants in a coordinated planetary project. Unfortunately, we often seem determined to prove otherwise.

We can build systems that synthesize the knowledge of billions of people, yet we still struggle to cooperate across borders, parties, regions, and identities. Not because the problems are always impossibly complex, but because incentives, prestige, short-term interests, and the occasional outbreak of political chiquitaje remain remarkably durable features of human affairs.

There is something profoundly puzzling about it.

A species capable of contemplating the origins of the universe can still become hopelessly divided over symbolic disputes, procedural squabbles, and status contests that, viewed from sufficient distance, look suspiciously small. We no longer argue about the exact same goats that wandered into the neighboring field centuries ago, but we continue to manufacture functional equivalents with impressive creativity and enthusiasm.

Meanwhile, greed has not exactly retired from public life. New technologies arrive, new fortunes emerge, and many leaders discover once again that thinking in terms of the next election cycle, the next quarterly report, or the next personal advantage feels more natural than thinking at the scale of civilization. Not always. But often enough to matter.

The challenge is not that humanity lacks intelligence.

The challenge is that intelligence scales faster than wisdom, and capability scales faster than coordination.

Politicians naturally propose national solutions because nations are where political power resides. Taxation, regulation, ownership structures, and redistribution mechanisms all operate through existing states. Senator Bernie Sanders’ proposal to tax extraordinary AI-driven gains and return a portion of the benefits to the public deserves to be taken seriously in this context. It recognizes something many observers across the political spectrum are beginning to notice: AI systems derive value not only from private investment but also from a vast reservoir of collective human knowledge.

That insight is laudable.

It may even point toward a reasonable path for ensuring that the benefits of increasingly capable systems are shared more broadly rather than concentrated narrowly.

But here comes my “but.”

Even if Sanders’ proposal were implemented perfectly, it would still confront the deeper challenge that the systems themselves operate across borders while the mechanisms for redistribution remain tied to individual nations. A national dividend may help address national consequences. It does not fully answer the civilizational question.

This creates a peculiar asymmetry.

A sufficiently powerful AI system may affect labor markets in dozens of countries simultaneously. It may be trained on knowledge generated by people across the globe. The servers may sit in one jurisdiction, the investors in another, the users in hundreds more. The benefits and disruptions spread through a planetary informational network largely indifferent to political borders.

A similar mismatch appears in public health. We often discuss outbreaks in distant countries as though Marco Polo had just arrived in Venice with alarming tales from a land beyond the edge of the known world. The fact that a pathogen can now cross continents faster than Marco Polo crossed a village somehow does little to diminish that feeling. We continue to treat many global health threats as though they were unfolding on Uranus rather than within the same densely connected civilization we inhabit.

The atmosphere does not care where a molecule originated. Viruses do not carry passports. Increasingly, informational systems appear equally indifferent to national borders.

This does not mean nation-states become irrelevant. Governments still regulate, tax, negotiate, and enforce. Companies remain subject to laws. Infrastructure exists in physical places. Reality eventually cashes out into jurisdictions.

But the scale mismatch remains.

The problem is civilizational.

The available tools are largely national.

Even if every country implemented excellent policies tomorrow, the deeper question would remain unresolved.

Who owns the products of collective learning?

That question is far stranger than it first appears.

AI systems are built using private capital, private engineering, and private risk-taking. Yet they are also built upon public research, open-source software, scientific knowledge, language itself, and centuries of accumulated human culture.

The training corpus looks suspiciously like a civilization-scale commons.

This is why arguments about ownership feel different in the AI era than they did in previous technological revolutions. The debate is no longer only economic. It is epistemic.

Who owns the systems that increasingly mediate knowledge, interpretation, memory, explanation, and attention?

That question begins to sound less like a debate about factories and more like a debate about libraries, universities, communication networks, and the informational infrastructure through which societies think.

Unfortunately, history offers little reassurance that extraordinary capability automatically produces wise outcomes.

A civilization can become extraordinarily capable while using both humans and machines in surprisingly stupid ways.

The Roman world produced remarkable engineering while remaining trapped in recurring political dysfunction. The Industrial Revolution transformed productivity while tolerating extraordinary human misery. The internet connected billions of people and then devoted a meaningful portion of its capacity to outrage optimization.

There is no law stating that intelligence, capability, and wisdom must increase together.

Indeed, they often do not.

The future may not resemble the clean technological trajectories imagined by either utopians or doomers. It may instead resemble a civilization becoming progressively more capable while struggling to coordinate around the consequences of its own success.

A civilization that can train frontier AI systems while remaining politically fragmented.

A civilization that can model climate systems while arguing about basic facts.

A civilization capable of mapping exoplanets while still becoming trapped inside local incentive structures.

And perhaps, if we are being honest, a civilization capable of generating endless new disagreements even after solving some of the old ones. If ancient cities could spend generations arguing over whose goat wandered into whose field, modern societies can certainly invent equally passionate disputes over algorithms, data rights, and digital borders. The names change. The coordination challenge remains.

This is not necessarily a sign of failure.

It may simply be the normal condition of complex adaptive systems.

The truly remarkable fact is not that humans remain tribal, emotional, and imperfect. The remarkable fact is that they have managed to build global systems of cooperation despite those limitations.

Perhaps that is the real lesson of collective learning.

Humanity was never required to become wise before becoming powerful.

It only had to become coordinated enough.

Whether wisdom eventually catches up remains an open question.

The Cerberus Market

 

Commodity, Broker, Consumer: Marx, Keynes, and Smith on AI Capitalism

The economic problem is simple enough to state plainly: if capitalism weakens the consumer, who is left to buy? AI capitalism promises cheaper production, more automation, and more productivity. But capitalism does not run on production alone. It runs on production that can be sold. Someone must have money, freedom, and reason to buy what the system produces.

That is where the contradiction starts. A company can cut labor costs and improve its margins. But wages are also demand. If many companies automate work, weaken bargaining power, and concentrate income, the system may become better at producing and worse at selling. It becomes a beautiful machine with a shrinking customer base.

The same problem appears in platform and AI markets. People are not only buyers. They are also data sources, training material, behavioral signals, unpaid evaluators, and dependent users. The market is not merely selling to them. It is built through them.

The system wants people cheap as workers, rich as consumers, transparent as data sources, dependent as users, and creative as training material. Those demands cannot all be satisfied forever.

The Role Confusion

There is an inherited absurdity in being commodity, broker, and consumer at once, because those roles are supposed to be structurally separate. A commodity is sold. A broker mediates the sale. A consumer buys.

Cerberus works because the three heads share one body. Commodity, broker, and consumer are supposed to be separate market roles because they have different interests. In AI capitalism, they are fused into one subject. The result is not clever integration but structural impracticality: one body is asked to be the value extracted, the mechanism of circulation, and the buyer charged for access.

You are the commodity because your behavior, attention, language, preferences, social graph, and future likelihoods are packaged as value.

You are the broker because your clicks, prompts, shares, corrections, ratings, posts, and interactions help route, train, validate, and refine the system. You are not merely being sold; you are helping organize the conditions of the sale.

You are the consumer because you pay for access, products, subscriptions, recommendations, visibility, productivity tools, identity services, and sometimes even privacy from the same systems extracting from you.

This is more than unfairness. It creates economic confusion. If the person is input, market signal, buyer, and disposable cost all at once, the system has trouble knowing what the person is for. It wants to extract from the person and sell to the person at the same time. That can work for a while. It cannot work cleanly forever.

Marx: The Contradiction Inside Capital

Marx helps because he understood capitalism as a system that creates contradictions from within. Capital wants to reduce labor costs, increase productivity, expand markets, and accumulate profit. But labor is not only a cost. Workers are also consumers, social beings, and the human base through which production is reproduced.

This is the contradiction AI sharpens. Capital wants labor minimized at the point of production and maximized at the point of consumption. It wants fewer workers to pay, but enough consumers to buy. Each firm may rationally automate and cut costs. But if many firms do it at scale, the wage base erodes. The individual capitalist behaves rationally; the system becomes collectively irrational. It is the old contradiction wearing better software.

Marx would also notice enclosure. Shared human knowledge, language, code, art, behavior, and social intelligence become raw material for privately owned systems. The collective output of human culture is turned into proprietary capability. Then that capability is sold back as access. This is not land enclosure in the old form, but it has the same structure: a commons becomes private revenue.

The alienation also mutates. In industrial capitalism, the worker is separated from the product of labor. In AI capitalism, people are separated from patterns of their own lives, expressions, and intelligence, which return as proprietary services, rankings, recommendations, scores, and tools.

Keynes: The Demand Problem

Keynes would ask the blunt question: who has the money to buy what the economy can produce? If productivity rises while purchasing power concentrates, the economy can produce more than ordinary people can afford to consume. That is not abundance. It is imbalance.

The rich do not consume in the same proportion as ordinary households. A dollar shifted from wages to profits does not automatically return as broad demand. It may become savings, asset speculation, share buybacks, monopoly expansion, or investment in further labor displacement.

This is the bakery problem: a bakery that can make infinite bread in a town where everybody is celiac is technically impressive and economically useless. The issue is not whether the bakery is productive. The issue is whether its output can be absorbed.

A Keynesian rescue would require political management of AI productivity gains: redistribution, public investment, shorter working hours, income supports, stronger automatic stabilizers, and institutions that keep productivity gains from concentrating entirely at the top. The technical question is demand. The social question is whether automation becomes shared freedom or private rent.

Adam Smith: The Moral Conditions of Markets

Adam Smith can be rescued, but only if we rescue the real Smith, not the cartoon version. Smith was not simply saying greed magically saves society. His economics sits beside a moral theory of sympathy, justice, prudence, trust, and social judgment. Markets require more than self-interest. They require conditions under which exchange is not domination dressed as choice.

Smith was suspicious of monopolies, collusion, rent-seeking, and merchants who capture public policy for private advantage. He understood that business interests often prefer restriction over open competition. He did not think concentrated commercial power automatically serves the public good.

From a Smithian perspective, platform and AI capitalism are suspect because they distort the conditions of free exchange. A market is not truly free when users cannot understand the bargain, avoid the infrastructure, inspect how visibility is priced, contest data extraction, or negotiate with the systems that mediate their work and social life.

This is where the moral dimension matters. Not Victorian respectability, exactly. Smith belongs to the Scottish Enlightenment, shaped by a Protestant moral world in which sympathy, restraint, justice, and social judgment still mattered. A market with the handshake removed and the fine print promoted to king is not a purified market. It is a predatory one.

Remove Smith’s moral compass from Smith’s economics, and the market becomes a logistics system with no conscience. The mistake is not returning to Adam Smith; the mistake is returning to a mutilated Smith, a Smith stripped of sympathy, justice, and suspicion of commercial power.

The market has something of the old maritime trade route in it: cargo, brokers, ledgers, risk, ports, insurance, and respectable distance from harm. The point is not to flatten historical differences, but to notice the recurring form: human life converted into transferable value, moved through an infrastructure of intermediaries, and morally laundered as commerce. In that register, the person is cargo, navigator, and passenger at once: helping steer the ship, paying for the voyage, and still getting marched onto the plank when margins demand it.

The Disappearing Economic Agent

Modern economics often begins with the rational economic agent, but this premise depends on social conditions the model usually treats as background: trust, information, autonomy, stable institutions, enforceable contracts, and meaningful alternatives.

If capitalism corrodes those conditions, the agent at the center of economic theory disappears. What remains is not a free chooser but a managed subject inside private and public infrastructures. At that point, even production is no longer guaranteed, because production itself depends on coordination, skill, trust, demand, and social reproduction.

Smith’s moral dimension is not decorative. It is part of the market’s operating system. Without it, the rational agent disappears; exchange degrades; demand weakens; productivity loses meaning; and capital becomes control over decaying assets.

When Productivity Loses Its Market

The productivity problem is not only that productivity may fall. The deeper issue is that productivity can lose its ordinary capitalist meaning. In capitalism, productivity matters because more output can become more value. But that only works if output can be sold. Without demand, productivity becomes capacity without realization.

Productivity without demand is a factory on an island, getting more efficient at producing goods no ship comes to collect. The machines may be excellent. The output may be enormous. But the market circuit is broken.

Here productivity needs to be understood in its oldest and most basic sense: the capacity to produce more output with less labor, time, land, energy, or material. That meaning has been with us since the agricultural revolution. But under capitalism, productivity must also pass through the market. It becomes economically meaningful not only when more can be produced, but when that output can be sold, financed, or otherwise absorbed as value.

This is the Hegelian shape of the problem, later sharpened by Marx: the contradiction is not external to the system. It grows from inside it. The same logic that pushes capital to automate labor, weaken wages, and concentrate ownership also weakens the consumer base that makes productivity profitable. Put less politely: even in Gucci shoes, shooting yourself in the foot still hurts.

If the mass consumer weakens, the old civilizational meaning of productivity does not disappear. But its ordinary capitalist channel breaks. Producing more with less is still technically powerful; it is just no longer enough to sustain a consumer market. Capital then looks for projects large enough to absorb capacity and justify investment: defense, energy infrastructure, climate adaptation, data centers, compute expansion, logistics, resource control, administrative automation, elite health, or other megaprojects. Space colonization is the cartoon endpoint of this logic; the nearer versions wear hard hats, uniforms, lab coats, and procurement badges.

This changes the question. The market no longer asks only, who buys the product? It asks, what project can absorb capital, machinery, labor, and legitimacy? When the checkout line disappears, capital starts looking for a construction site.

That is why this is not ordinary consumer capitalism. Productivity becomes less consumer-facing and more project-facing. It serves states, corporations, infrastructure owners, security systems, and elite markets. The public may still be involved, but less as a strong consumer and more as a managed population inside the project.

Three Diagnoses, One Crisis

Marx, Keynes, and Smith point to different parts of the same crisis. Marx says the system undermines its own social base. Keynes says it threatens effective demand. Smith says it corrupts the moral and competitive conditions that make markets legitimate.

Put together, the diagnosis is sharp: AI capitalism may produce too efficiently for a society whose income, autonomy, and moral foundations it has eroded. The problem is not that the system cannot produce enough. The problem is that it may damage the people, institutions, and markets that make production meaningful.

Who Will Buy?

The likely answer is stratification. Wealthy individuals buy premium agency: better AI, better health, better education, better privacy, better security, better lawyers, and better insulation from the systems others must inhabit. Firms buy automation to reduce labor dependence. States buy AI for administration, surveillance, defense, welfare management, policing, and public service automation. Ordinary people receive cheaper, degraded, subsidized, ad-supported, behavior-extractive versions.

So the market may not disappear. It may mutate. The old mass consumer becomes less central. Corporations, states, and wealthy households become the most solvent consumers. Everyone else becomes a managed user base: economically weaker, behaviorally legible, technologically dependent, and still valuable as data, attention, compliance, and political population.

The mall does not vanish; it becomes a members-only logistics hub with a public waiting room. That is the drift from consumer capitalism toward rentier-control capitalism. The system earns less by selling abundant goods to a broadly prosperous public and more by charging access, controlling infrastructure, extracting data, licensing intelligence, managing risk, and selling tools of optimization to those who can pay.

If there is any Smithian hope here, it is not that markets fix themselves. It is that markets can be made legitimate, and kept from becoming self-defeating, only when they are held inside moral and institutional limits: fair competition, public goods, real alternatives, restraints on monopoly, and a social world in which people can still act as agents rather than managed inputs.

Smith does not rescue the system by blessing self-interest. He rescues the question by reminding us that commerce without moral conditions is not freedom; it is organized dependency.

The consumer problem is where Marx's contradiction, Keynes's demand failure, and Smith's moral test meet. Not a pleasant room, but a very clear one.

A Nation with a Tired Playbook

 

On national identity, threat, and how deep the blade went under the skin

When I first moved to the United States, one of the things that struck me most was the country’s humor and vernacular optimism. Americans seemed trained to turn discomfort into jokes and uncertainty into possibility. Coming from a society with a different emotional weather, that was not a small difference. It felt structural.

For years, liberal comedy did this especially well. It made absurdity breathable. It took hypocrisy, bureaucracy, corruption, bad faith, moral panic, and institutional stupidity and turned them into oxygen. The joke did not erase the danger, but it created enough space to survive recognizing it.

That is why I do not observe the thinning of that humor as a minor cultural detail. In my view, humor and optimism were part of the American operating system. When a society that once metabolized absurdity through jokes begins preserving dread at full strength, something has changed.

The problem is not that Americans, or liberals in particular, suddenly became less funny. The problem is that politics became too compelling, too consequential, and too deranged to remain safely comic.

Every day delivers a fresh spectacle: courts, billionaires, executive orders, corruption, cruelty, constitutional dread. The material arrives pre-satirized. You do not even need to get creative. Reality keeps walking onstage wearing the costume.

That sounds like a gift to comedians, but it is not. Comedy needs absurdity with a little room around it. It needs enough distance for the body to say: this is insane, but I can breathe around it. When the absurdity has legal force, police force, market force, or institutional consequence, the laugh does not fully release. The body knows the joke can still hurt you.

So the tone changes. The comedian becomes a witness. The satirist becomes an archivist. The late-night monologue becomes less a release valve than a nightly inventory of damage. What used to make absurdity breathable now often preserves danger at full strength.

This is not a failure of intelligence. It is a failure of distance. You cannot live every evening inside “their finest hour.” A nervous system cannot afford a daily version of Churchill announcing Britain’s entrance into World War II, even when some of the alarms are real.

America is not merely polarized. It is trying to regulate itself on a dancing landscape.

Everything that should provide ground has begun to move: parties, courts, platforms, media, prices, borders, identity, work, truth, expertise, even the weather. The result is not just disagreement. It is a national nervous system running threat detection at high volume.

The American model is legacy software running on that dancing landscape. It was built for another era, when the United States reigned more confidently, industry occupied more of the social imagination, and adulthood could still be narrated as a sequence: job, house, savings, retirement, inheritance. That world was never as fair or universal as nostalgia claims, but it was stable enough to make the model believable.

Now the ground moves, but the script remains. Households are still told to optimize, invest, hustle, insure, retrain, borrow, and believe in the future, while ordinary life becomes a sequence of cliffs: rent, medical bills, childcare, debt, layoffs, insurance, groceries, one missed paycheck, one broken car.

This is where the stock market becomes offensive.

Not because a rising market is bad in itself, but because of what it is asked to symbolize. Survey after survey says roughly a third of Americans lack even a few hundred dollars of emergency cushion; many could not cover a $400 or $500 shock without borrowing, selling something, or moving closer to the red line. And yet the Dow, the Nasdaq, and the S&P keep smiling from their evergreen all-time-high peak, as if the dashboard were proof that the machine is healthy.

The split screen is obscene.

The chart says abundance.
The household says threat.
The index says historic high.
The kitchen table says one more bill.

This is not simply inequality. It is a crisis of interpretation. The country is told to read market highs as national health, while millions of households experience the same economy as fragility, exposure, and triage.

Automation sharpens the contradiction. If the old model depended on labor scarcity being solved by more labor, the new model is less clear. Machines, software, and AI do not eliminate the need for workers everywhere, but they do change the social imagination of work. Stable labor positions begin to feel less abundant, less durable, less able to absorb everyone.

In that environment, the cons of immigration become easier to dramatize than the pros. The immigrant may still be economically useful, even necessary, in whole sectors of the economy. But politically, the figure begins to look less like labor and more like pressure.

 A society under that much contradiction needs an explanation it can touch. So it turns toward the immigrant.

This is not an accident. Immigrant labor has long been useful to the economy alive: in fields, kitchens, construction sites, care work, cleaning, delivery, meatpacking, warehouses, hotels, and all the places where the official economy prefers not to look directly at its own dependencies. The immigrant body has been used as infrastructure: underpaid, overworked, politically exposed, socially deniable.

But at a certain point, the value changes.

The economy once needed the immigrant hidden in the kitchen, field, warehouse, or care home. Now power can use that same body as evidence, warning, spectacle, and offering. The worker who helped keep the machine running becomes proof that the machine was invaded.

This is the sacrificial logic. The legacy model is failing, but the failure is too large, too distributed, too abstract, too implicated in everyone’s arrangements. Financialization cannot be shouted at from a rally stage with the same visceral satisfaction. Asset inflation does not have a face. Deindustrialization is too historical. Healthcare is too bureaucratic. Housing scarcity is too local and too national at once. The dancing landscape has too many causes.

The immigrant simplifies the landscape.

Here is a body.
Here is a border.
Here is a story.
Here is the thing that crossed.
Here is the reason you are afraid.

The cruelty is that both legal and illegal immigrants can be absorbed into the same ritual. Legality matters administratively, but politically the category can be blurred whenever the machinery needs a larger offering. The point is not accuracy. The point is conversion: anxiety into anger, precarity into blame, structural failure into a human target.

The immigrant is made to carry a contradiction the society cannot metabolize. A country that depended on the labor now performs outrage at the presence. A market that benefited from the worker now lets politics treat the body as contamination. The person who helped keep the machine running becomes evidence that the machine was invaded.

That is why the sacrifice is propitiatory. It does not solve the crisis. It gives the crisis a victim.

The old model cannot admit that the ground has changed. So it asks for a body.

There. That is why the gods are angry.

The armor failed, but the forge is not gone

What worries me most is not any single item on this list. Not the market, not the media, not the border, not even the politics of blame. It is the possibility that all of it has gone under the skin.

A country can survive bad policy, bad markets, bad leaders, bad news cycles. What is harder to survive is a change in temperament: when humor stops functioning as oxygen, when optimism becomes performance, when precarity becomes identity, when politics becomes weather, when sacrifice becomes explanation.

That is why noticing the change matters. Noticing is not enough, but it is not nothing. A society cannot repair what it keeps misnaming. If dread has replaced humor, if spectacle has replaced explanation, if scapegoating has replaced diagnosis, then the first constructive act may be to say so clearly.

The point is not to recover a naive optimism. The old optimism belonged to an older landscape. But there may be another kind: not the optimism of denial, but the optimism of refusing the sacrifice. The optimism of insisting that the dancing ground is real, that the model is old, that the anger has causes, and that no body should be asked to carry them all.

The World´s New Disorder

Cover of The Newyorker Magazine
on Flickr under Creative Commons License

The following thoughts are the result of brainstorming two articles that have quite opposite stances. One of them is Yascha Mounk's "The Best-Case Scenario for the Trump Presidency" the other one is Simon Kuper's How to avert catastrophe" published in the Financial Times.

I have to agree with Mounk when he says that "confident predictions of doom are as simplistic as mindless optimism". However, I cannot do other than admit that there is a lot of truth in Kuper's affirmation when he says that "Today’s elites are often mocked for failing to foresee the financial crisis of 2008 but, in fact, such blindness is standard. In 1914, few people expected the first world war: the historian Niall Ferguson has shown that bond prices held up that summer, meaning that investors didn’t foresee higher government borrowing. Forecasters also missed the Holocaust, China’s Cultural Revolution and September 11."

I have to admit that, for as badly as I intend to opt for Mounk's approach to today's reality, I'm inclined to make a catastrophe-prediction: the World will give us a long-lasting lesson. Globalization is way too advanced. Betting against it, a loser bet. Free market can be a double-sided knife. Anybody, any country, allies or enemies can bubble you up and pinch you down. If they didn't do it so far is because we have been good boys, great consumers; because it's more profitable let's being prosperous and play inside our markets than bet against it. But, change those rules, bully the World around with your military power, alienate your traditional allies, and we'll have a huge retaliation. 

Globalization is the logical corollary of free society and free market. Globalization is the brain-child of liberal capitalism. In a trade war against China or Russia, with their market regulations and laws about who can own stocks or bonds, they will be the indisputable winners. 

Welfare State and Technological Revolution: a Good Pairing

Image by Frits Ahlefeldt under

 Creative Commons License

I always thought that Capitalism was the best economic model. Now, in the face of the new Technological revolution, I feel I have to reconsider this ideology. 

"The World Economic Forum has estimated that five millions jobs will be lost by 2020. A 2013 Oxford study estimated that 47% of U.S. employment is at risk of being computerized."[i]
We need to come up with a way to give proper response to those that cannot make a living no because don´t have the will, but because the system fails to create the right niche timely.

I´m not talking about “socialism” that would imply to withdraw money from people who managed to thrive and make a fortune under the previous model. I don´t believe that is precisely fair. But, I believe that putting taxes over the profits of the new technological activities, and redistribute them to the people that has been left out of the system, is a measure that should be taken by the governments, in order to keep a healthy society.

All the attempts to apply the same capitalist recipes to solve economic problems will fail, if we don´t recognize that we are facing a new and different paradigm.

I think history is making a call for the return of a Welfare model.

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[i] McFarland, Matt. "Trump's Populism Is Only the Beginning. Here Come the Robots." CNNMoney. Cable News Network, 17 Nov. 2016. Web. 28 Nov. 2016.